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Cowen: Foreword

FOREWORD
It is a commonly held belief that, for a select group of law students,
law review experience constitutes the finest possible legal education;
and this may well be so. Certainly an overwhelming percentage of the
bench and practicing bar must believe it since, in their recruiting, they
almost always either require law review experience as a condition of
employment or state that it is a highly desirable background. And it
can be demonstrated in every school that the law review men are the
first to find post-graduate employment and are tendered the most
desirable positions. Unfortunately, law review training can be made
available only to a relatively small percentage of a student body, and
the publication of a review is so costly, both in money and in effort,
that the educational advantage would not justify the double expense
were there not other benefits more important to society to be derived.
These benefits do exist, and they are of such magnitude that the
student educational value, as important as it is, actually becomes
merely incidental.
Dean Pound, in commenting on the necessity for appellate courts,
once suggested:
That hasty, unfair or erroneous action may be reversed by a
court of review holds back the impulsive, impels caution, constrains fairness and moves tribunals to keep to the best of their
ability in the straight path.'
He recognized, of course, that the basic reason for the existence of
courts of review is to reverse erroneous decisions of the courts below,
but he also saw that this power of reversal has a cautionary value as
well. The direct power is to correct an error already made; the incidental power is to discourage future error. Law reviews, it is submitted, can and do exercise precisely this same cautionary function
with respect to all courts but particularly with respect to courts of
review. Law reviews have no direct power of reversal, but they do
have the power of truth, reason and publicity which may be even
stronger deterrents to those few judicial officers who, for one reason
or another, may be tempted to give less than their best.
But as important as this function can be, it is still not the most
important function. This, rather, is the area of law reform. Of course,
in some states there are agencies specifically established to bring about
1 PouND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIvI. CAsES 3 (1941).
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law reform, 2 and there are national groups dedicated to the same end.3
But at best, these can accomplish only a small amount of what needs
doing, and involve a relatively small number of people. The existence
of law reviews, however, makes available a forum for any well-expressed, documented idea on law reform and encourages the background research and critical appraisal so necessary to a product of
value. It is in this area that a law review in large measure justifies its
existence.
To further these ends the Georgia Law Review is born. 4 There is
no doubt that it has been, and will continue to be, of exceptional
educational value to the members of its staff. Hopefully the judicial
officers of Georgia and the nation will come to respect the critical
analyses which will appear in its pages. But its true success will depend
upon how skillful its editors and contributors are in seeking out the
weak points in our law, in developing appropriate recommendations
for change, and in advocating them persuasively in its pages. We
believe, in the words of Mr. Justice Walter V. Schaefer, that "the
law is not a closed system but a process," 5 and the growing complexity
of our society demands continuous examination, increasing both in
volume and in depth, of our laws and legal institutions. The Georgia
Law Review can perform a vital service, and, with full assurance that
it will, its student editors and the Faculty of the University of Georgia
School of Law respectfully present to the profession the Georgia Law
Review, Volume I, Number I.
LINDSEY COWEN

Dean
2 E.g., The Louisiana State Law Institute, LA. REv. STATs. tit. 24, §§ 201-05 (1950);

The New York Law Revision Committee, N.Y. LEiSLATivE LAw §§ 70-72 (McKinney 1952).
3 E.g., The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
4 "Reborn" might be a more accurate word since there was an issue of a Georgia Law
Review published in 1927-28. However, the lapse of time and the expanded goals for
the Review have led the editors to consider the present Review an entirely new venture justifying a new Volume I, Number I.
5 Schaefer, Chief Justice Traynor and the Judicial Process, 53 CAUF. L. REv. 11, 16
(1965).
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